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ABSTRACT 
Have you ever formed an intention to reply to an email only to find that, after a short passage of 
time, you cannot remember if you actually did send the email, or simply intended to? The present 
work examines the effect of gist and detailed processing on the ability to reduce these errors of 
intention-behavior conflation. As detailed processing involves encoding specific features of an 
event, we hypothesized that intentions or behaviors encoded in more detail would be more 
discriminable in memory, and thus, reduce the likelihood of producing intention-driven illusory 
behaviors. In two experiments, we used a hiring paradigm to posit a means of attenuating this 
effect. Experiment 1 demonstrated that processing intentions in a detailed manner reduced the 
proportion of illusory behaviors reported. Experiment 2 showed that this type of processing was 
most effective when it was done to keep track of behaviors. Methodological limitations of 
exclusively relying on behavioral data are discussed, as well as future directions to both extend 
current work to meet the demands of technological advances that reduce the necessity to engage 
in internal monitoring processes, and explore conditions wherein intention-driven illusory 
behaviors are actually less likely to occur. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Have you ever formed the intention to reply to an email, refill the parking meter, or 
follow a medication regimen, only to find that, at a later point in time, you cannot remember if 
you actually did so or simply intended to? The successful implementation of intentions thus not 
only requires the formation of an intention, but the ability to distinguish between unfulfilled 
intentions from those that have already been acted upon. The present work examines the effect of 
gist and detailed processing on the ability to reduce these errors of intention-behavior conflation. 
We expected that the ability to process intentions in greater detail would allow intentions to be 
more distinguishable in memory from behaviors, and thus, reduce the likelihood of producing 
intention-driven illusory behaviors.  
The Intention-Behavior Association 
 A quick search of Web of Science for the search terms intentions AND behavior reveals 
23,486 results across various domains, including those of consumer, health and social 
psychology. For example, the intention-behavior association has been used to explain childrens’ 
participation in physical activity (Yeung, Yuan, Hui & Feresu, 2016), discreet food choice 
behaviors (McDermott et al., 2015), the decision to stay smoke-free (Murnaghan et al., 2009), 
purchase intentions of technology products (Chang, Tsai, Hung & Lin, 2015), the continued use 
of transit services (de Ona, d Ona, Eboli, Forciniti & Mazzulla, 2016), passengers’ behaviors 
towards drivers who text (Wang, 2016), engagement in environmentally friendly activities (Han, 
Hsu & Sheu, 2010), rumor combating behavior on social media (Zhao, Yin & Song, 2016), 
knowledge sharing (Hung, Lai & Chou, 2015; Stewart, May & Ledgerwood, 2015), and 
intentions to participate in blood donations (Faqah, Moiz, Shahid, Ibrahim & Raheem, 2015). 
 2 
This research reflects how common the investigation of intention-behavior association is in 
research, as well as the flexibility and adaptability of this relation in being able to describe a 
variety of different situations. 
 Meta-analytic reviews offer a synthesized perspective of this research. Such reviews have 
found that the average correlation between an intention and behavior is r = .45 (Albarracín, 
Johnson, Fishbein & Muellerleile, 2001) and r = .57 (Webb & Sheeran, 2006), and to vary as a 
function of both individual and methodological factors. For example, the intention-behavior 
correlation tends to increase when actual or perceived behavioral control is higher, when the 
behavior is not habitual in nature, when the time interval between the measurement of the 
intention and the behavior is short, and when self-report measures are used (Albarracín et al., 
2001; Sheeran, 2002; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). These reviews describe the variety of contexts 
within which, and the factors that affect how, intentions are translated to behaviors. 
 The underlying premise of the intention-behavior literature, however, may not always be 
accurate. This research assumes that the pathway from intentions to behavior is linear: An 
intention is formed, a behavior is enacted, and a memory trace for the behavior is produced. 
There are, however, situations when intentions can have the ironic effect of undermining 
behavior. In such cases, the formation of an intention to perform a behavior can result in the 
behavior being bypassed to directly generate a memory trace for that behavior (see Figure 1).  
 To examine the existence and nature of this effect, Jones and Albarracín (2015) designed 
an empirical hiring paradigm, which involved the formation of both hiring decisions and 
intentions. This work showed that not only do intentions increase the likelihood of producing 
false memories of behavior (compared to a control condition), but that this effect occurs even 
when intentions are purely mental, behaviors are enacted in a physical manner, and behaviors 
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occur at a high frequency (e.g., when the number of behavioral trials are increased). This work 
has ruled out familiarity with behavior as a potential explanation (e.g., by varying the exposure 
time to form decisions vs. intentions), and revealed that the effect is not eliminated even when a 
response option to indicate uncertainty is introduced, or when intentions are spoken out loud. 
Finally, this work suggests that intention-driven illusory behaviors lead to a failure to act when 
the opportunity arises.  
In terms of real-world applicability, false memories of medication commission, for 
example, can be deleterious. In fact, studies on medication non-adherence suggest that non-
adherence to a mediation regimen can result in morbidity, mortality and other health-related 
costs (Lehane & McCarthy, 2007). Researchers now understand that medication non-adherence 
often occurs unintentionally, with facets such as disruptions to daily routines and forgetfulness 
being key in explaining such phenomenon (Johnson, 2002; Lehane & McCarthy, 2007). A 
qualitative study by Penza-Clyve, Mansell & McQuaid (2004) addressing children’s perspective 
on, and adherence to, their asthma medications revealed that, a major barrier to adherence is 
memory: Children who formed an intention to take their medications would later forget to do so, 
or have difficulty remembering if they had already taken their medications or not. This suggests 
that intention-driven illusory behaviors may be one aspect of the prospective memory errors 
underlying adherence. Based on this work, and given the many relevant deleterious 
consequences, much work is needed to understand the mechanisms underlying intention-driven 
illusory behaviors, and identify the ways in which it can be attenuated.  
Prospective and Retrospective Memory 
 Research on prospective and retrospective memory provides some insight into the 
processes that may underlie the intention-driven illusory behavior effect. The Zeigarnik effect 
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(Zeigarnik, 1927; see Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007), for example, describes how our 
memory for an event left unfinished or incomplete remains salient until after its completion. A 
related phenomenon, the intention superiority effect (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, Hicks & 
Bink, 1998), describes how the time taken to retrieve items from memory related to an 
incomplete intention is faster when compared to the time taken for items not associated with 
intentions (e.g., individuals retrieve “waiter” from memory faster than “dog” when their 
intention is to attend a restaurant). Therefore, intentions that have yet to be fulfilled are often 
hyperaccessible in memory and, it can be inferred, more easily retrievable from memory.  
One issue with both the Zeigarnik effect and the intention superiority effect are that, their 
concern is for memory of intentions, but not memory of behaviors. As such, although these 
models provide a foundation for intention research, they do not directly speak to the effects of 
unfulfilled intentions on the memory of behavior. Additionally, the hyperaccessibility of an 
intention in memory does not mean that the intention will always be correctly identified as one 
that has been completed or not. On the contrary, we propose that, in some situations, intentions 
that are accessible may be mistaken as behaviors. Research on retrospective memory offers some 
insight into this potential fallibility of memory. Memory fabrications or distortions, so-called 
false memories, are often harmless (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993): Misremembering 
what you had for dinner last night does not have severe repercussions. Yet, there are 
circumstances when memory inaccuracies can be troubling, such as false reports in eyewitness 
testimonies (e.g., Loftus & Zanni, 1975) or child abuse cases (e.g., Loftus & Davis, 2006). 
Studies have found that cultural expectations (Bartlett, 1932), labels (Carmichael, Hogan & 
Walter, 1932; Lupyan, 2008), and the associations between related items (Deese, 1959; for a 
review, see Gallo, 2010) can distort memories and lead to errors in recall and recognition. In 
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extreme cases, even memories of events that never happened can be implanted (Loftus & 
Pickrell, 1995). This demonstrates how memories are not always accurate, but rather, prone to 
fallacy.  
 Why is memory imperfect? According to the source monitoring framework (Johnson, et 
al., 1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000), failures in memory arise due to an inability to correctly 
discriminate the origins of some mental experiences from others. This is especially the case 
when information from different sources (e.g., perception and imagination) share similar 
characteristics. For example, since intentions often precede behaviors, the evaluations that go 
into intentions may also take place during the production of behavior. This can lead to 
difficulties discriminating between memories of the intended behavior from memories of the 
completed behavior.  
 Memories are fallible because they not only involve informational sources that are poorly 
differentiated, but cognitive processes that are also imperfect (Johnson et al., 1993; Brainerd & 
Reyna, 2002). The fuzzy trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; Brainerd & Reyna, 2002) posits 
that there are two ways in which memories are represented: Verbatim traces are exact 
representations of events, and thus involve individuals re-experiencing the occurrence of events 
in specific contexts; in contrast, gist traces are vague and fuzzy representations of events, thereby 
only leading to feelings of familiarity. When gist traces are strong, this sense of familiarity can 
generate the recollection of a non-experienced event, especially when the event serves as a cue 
for the gist trace of an experienced event (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). Suppose, for example, one 
is presented with a list of words including carrot, corn and bean. During a recognition test, the 
items carrot (target), pea (related distractor) and knife (unrelated distractor) are shown. Reliance 
on gist memory would lead to the recognition of both carrot and pea, as they are both vegetables 
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and activate a similar memory trace. Reliance on verbatim memory, on the other hand, would 
only lead to the acceptance of carrot. Since intentions and behaviors involve similar cognitive 
processes, it is possible that the gist processing of an intention can activate memories of 
situations wherein the intention led to behavior, leading to the conflation of the two.  
The Present Research 
 The fallibility of memory can be attributed to errors in encoding (via gist or detailed 
processing) and retrieval (via source monitoring). Intentions and behaviors may be encoded in 
gist form which, due to similarities in the behavioral and cognitive processes underlying the two, 
can lead to source monitoring errors during retrieval. As such, one way to potentially attenuate 
this effect would be to target one, or both, of these processes. This thesis thus seeks to investigate 
whether encouraging participants to engage in detailed processing can help reduce false illusions 
of behavior. Specifically, we hypothesized that, because detailed processing involves encoding 
specific features of an event, intentions encoded in more detail will be more distinguishable in 
memory, and thus, reduce the likelihood of intention-driven illusory behaviors.  
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Overview 
 The purpose of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether there were differences in the 
proportion of intention-driven illusory behaviors reported between individuals who were 
encouraged to process and encode their intentions in a gist vs. detailed format (compared to a 
control that received no instructions). Using a hiring paradigm, we asked participants to keep 
track of their intentions to hire or not hire an applicant by writing them down. In the gist 
processing condition, participants were asked to write down the unique identifier accompanying 
each applicant (e.g., ID: 0r398t6) and their hiring intentions regarding them (e.g., Yes or No); in 
the detailed processing condition, however, participants were asked to be descriptive by also 
elaborating on characteristics of the applicant that influenced their hiring intentions. As detailed 
processing allows the formation of more specific and vivid memories, we hypothesized that 
encouraging participants to process their intentions in detail would help them discriminate 
between intentions and behaviors in memory, and thus, make fewer errors conflating the two, 
compared to both those engaged in gist processing and those in the control condition.  
Method  
 Participants. A hundred and twenty-eight undergraduates, recruited from the University 
of Illinois Subject Pool, participated for partial course credit. The sample consisted of 78 
females, 35 males, 1 who identified as other, and 14 who did disclose their gender. The 
participants ranged in age from 18 and 23 years (M = 19.85, SD = 2.39). Informed consent was 
obtained from all participants before proceeding with the experiment. 
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 Materials and procedures. Participants played the role of a manager evaluating 
applications of models to hire for their company’s clothing catalogue. Participants were 
informed, however, that due to an error made by an intern, some of the photographs were 
incorrectly paired with the application forms. For those applications that were unaffected by the 
mistake, participants were told that they could make a hiring decision, wherein they officially 
hired or rejected the model from inclusion in the clothing catalogue. For those applications that 
were affected, participants were told that they should still determine whether the model should 
be included in the catalogue based on the photograph provided. However, because of the 
mismatch between the application form and photograph, participants were asked to form a hiring 
intention, wherein they generated the intention to hire or reject the model once the applications 
were sorted1. Finally, for those applications that had yet to be classified as affected or not, 
participants were told to check whether the gender of the model in the photograph matched the 
gender on the application form. Participants thus enacted a behavior (enact trials), formed an 
intention to perform a behavior at a later point in time (intend trials), and made a judgment that 
was irrelevant to behavior (control trials)2. All participants encountered these three trials in 
random order.  
 In order to aid them follow-up on those applicants for whom they made a hiring intention, 
participants were handed a tracking sheet. For those participants who were randomized into the 
gist processing condition, participants were asked to only write down the unique identifying 
                                                                
1 It was implied to participants that applications would be later sorted for them to revisit and act upon 
their hiring intentions. However, this opportunity never transpired, as the purpose of this experiment was 
to assess the confusability between unfulfilled intentions and behaviors.   
2 To ensure participants understood the distinction between the three trials, a five question multiple-
choice quiz followed the instructions. Incorrect responses were followed by feedback. Accuracy was 87% 
and 92% for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, respectively, indicating that participants understood the 
task, as well as what constituted a completed behavior (from an intended behavior). 
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number associated with each applicant and their intention to hire or not hire them. For those 
participants in the detailed processing condition, along with the unique identifying number and 
their hiring intentions, participants were also asked to write down characteristics of the applicant 
that may have influenced their intention (e.g., age, gender, physical features), as well as other 
information that was pertinent to their choice (e.g., whether the applicant resembled someone 
they knew). Finally, for those participants in the control condition, participants were not 
explicitly asked to keep track of their hiring intentions3. Therefore, participants were randomly 
sorted into three different conditions, and processed their hiring intentions in gist (gist 
condition), detail (detailed condition), or in a manner not specified by the experiment (control 
condition).  
 Hiring phase. During the hiring phase, participants were first presented with a pre-trial 
instruction screen that informed participants whether the impending application form had been 
affected by the intern’s error, and thus, what type of response the participants were required to 
make. Participants had to press a unique key to demonstrate that they understood the instructions 
and what was expected of them (see Appendix A). To further help participants distinguish 
between the three trial types, the color of the main text and some application materials were 
consistent with the type of response participants had to make: Green for enact trials, red for 
intend trials and blue for control trials. 
Once participants indicated their understanding of the impending trial, participants were 
presented with truncated mock job application forms. The form was entitled “New Hire Form,” 
and included a section labeled “Final Hire Decision,” with a box to check “Yes” or “No,” a 
                                                                
3 As participants in this condition were not given a blank tracking sheet, we did not have any data on what 
these participants did and, as such, cannot ascertain whether, even in the absence of any prompting, 
participants in this condition engaged in some form of gist or detailed processing. 
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section that provided the applicant’s gender, and a section where the applicant’s photograph and 
unique identifying number were attached. Above each application, instructions described 
whether the application form had been affected by the intern’s error, and thus, what type of 
response the participant could make. For enact trials, the instructions read, “Correct photo / This 
is an official hire decision / Press ‘Y’ to hire. Press ‘N’ to not hire.” For intend trials, the 
instructions read, “Incorrect photo / Do you want to hire the applicant later? / Press ‘Y’ if you 
intend to hire them or “N” if you do not intend to hire them.” For control trials, the instructions 
read, “Unknown photo match / Press ‘Y’ or ‘N’ to indicate whether the gender on the form 
matches the gender of the photo” (see Appendix A). The models were represented with 30 
photographs taken from the Radboud Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010). The photographs 
included males, females, children and adults. Five photographs, equated for attractiveness by the 
database, were assigned to each of the enact, intend and control trials, resulting in the 
presentation of fifteen photographs total.   
 During the intend trials, participants were given instructions to use the tracking sheet that 
was provided for them to mark down their hiring intentions for the presented applicant. 
Participants were further informed that their tracking sheet would be returned at the end of the 
hiring phase, and thus, they should be aware of their responses to applicants in the intend trials. 
For those in the gist processing condition, instructions on the form read, “Please write down the 
alphanumeric code presented with their photograph, and mark down your intended hiring 
decision.” For those in the detailed processing condition, the instructions included the previous 
statement and “To further assist you, please also take note of any other salient characteristics of 
these applicants, including their gender, physical features, whether they resemble someone you 
know etc. Feel free to give them a nickname, create a story about why they may have applied and 
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so on. Also, take note of anything else that led you to your intention” (see Appendix B). For 
those in the control condition, no tracking sheet was given. At the completion of the hiring 
phase, a delay was introduced wherein participants were asked to complete individual difference 
measures4. During this delay, participants’ tracking sheets were collected.  
 Recognition phase. During the recognition phase, participants were tested on their 
memory of their hiring decisions. Again, participants were first presented with a pre-trial 
instruction screen that informed them that the objective of this section was to determine if they 
could remember those applicants for whom they had made a hiring decision for. The instructions 
further emphasized that these referred to those trials for which the application forms had not 
been affected, and thus, participants had been able to officially hire or reject the model from 
inclusion in the clothing catalogue (enact trials). Thirty photographs were presented in random 
order; fifteen displayed the photographs shown during the hiring phase, and the other 15 
displayed photographs that had not been presented at any point during the experiment. Above 
each photograph, participants were asked, “Did you make an official final hire decision?” and 
given three response options: “(1) I made an official final decision: yes, hire,” “(2) I made an 
official final decision: no, do not hire,” and “(3) I did not make an official final decision” (see 
Appendix A).  
Results 
 To identify intention-driven illusory behaviors, we calculated the proportion of responses 
indicated as final hire decisions for each trial type. Participants were accurate only if they 
responded in the affirmative to photographs that had been presented during the enact trials. 
                                                                
4 These measures included the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, the Need for Cognition Scale, and the 
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory. As they were only used in this (and the subsequent) experiments to 
introduce a time delay between the hiring and recognition phases, the measures are not included in any of 
the analyses below. 
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Participants were inaccurate if they responded in the affirmative to photographs that had been 
presented during the intend or control trials, with affirmative responses to photographs from the 
former being classified as intention-driven illusory behaviors.  
A mixed-factorial ANOVA was conducted to analyze the proportion of affirmative 
responses as a function of the three-level within-subject trial type factor (enact, intend, and 
control), and the three-level between-subject processing condition (gist, detailed, and control). 
Supporting the hypothesis of intention-driven illusory behaviors, we found a significant main 
effect of trial type, F(2, 250) = 76.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .38. The proportion of affirmative 
responses was higher in the intend trials (M = .68, SD = .31), than control trials (M = .36, SD = 
.30; indicating false recall), t(127) = 9.50, p < .001, d = 1.06, but was equivalent to the 
proportion of affirmative responses reported in the enact trials (M = .73, SD = .25), p = .11, d = 
0.18.  
 Critical to this experiment was the hypothesis that the difference in false memories 
between the intend and control conditions would be diminished in the detailed processing 
condition, compared to the gist or control processing conditions. As expected, there was a 
significant interaction between trial type and processing conditions, F(4, 250) = 2.81, p = .03, ηp2 
= .04 (see Figure 2). There was no significant difference in the proportion of affirmative 
responses for intend trials between participants in the gist (M = .68, SD = .32) and control 
processing conditions (M = .80, SD = .21), p = .26, d = 0.44. There was, however, a significant 
difference in the proportion of affirmative responses for intend trials between participants in the 
detailed (M = .57, SD = .35) and control processing conditions (M = .80, SD = .21), p = .002, d = 
0.80. Thus, intention-driven illusory behaviors in the intend trials decreased when participants 
engaged in a detailed and highly descriptive form of processing. 
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Discussion  
 Consistent with previous research (Jones & Albarracín, 2015), this experiment found that 
participants reported more falsely-recalled behaviors in the intend, than control, trial. Yet, when 
participants engaged in a detailed form of processing, compared to both gist and control 
processing conditions, their tendency to conflate their intentions for completed behaviors 
reduced significantly, and the ability to discriminate between what they had done (enact trials) 
and what they had yet to do (intend trials) improved. This experiment thus suggests that, even 
though intentions play an important role in creating false illusions of behavior, this error can be 
reduced when intentions are processed and encoded in more detail.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Overview 
 While the purpose of Experiment 1 was to investigate what type of processing was most 
useful in attenuating the intention-driven illusory behavior effect, the purpose of Experiment 2 
was to identify when it was most effective to rely on such a processing style. Specifically, the 
purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether there would be differences in the proportion 
of intention-driven illusory behaviors reported between individuals who were encouraged to 
process their intentions in more detail vs. those who were encouraged to process their behaviors 
in more detail (compared to controls who received no instructions). Using the same paradigm as 
the first experiment, we asked participants to keep track of either their intentions or their 
behaviors to hire or not hire an applicant. We hypothesized that, participants who processed their 
intentions in more detail would report fewer illusions of behavior, compared to a control 
condition. In contrast, we also hypothesized that participants who processed their behaviors in 
more detail would report greater accuracy of memory of what they had already done, but show 
no changes in proportions of intention-driven illusory behaviors, compared to a control 
condition.  
Method 
 Participants. A hundred and eighteen undergraduates, recruited from the University of 
Illinois Subject Pool, participated for partial course credit. The sample consisted of 86 females 
and 32 males, between the ages of 18 and 23 years (M = 19.85, SD = 2.39). Informed consent 
was obtained from all participants before proceeding with the experiment. 
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Materials and procedures. Experiment 2 was nearly identical to Experiment 1. The 
novelty in this experiment was that all processing instructions facilitated detailed encoding, and 
participants were randomly assigned to either process their enactments, their intentions, or 
neither. Thus, this experiment offered an opportunity to directly replicate our prior finding, while 
also gathering evidence of the possibility of improving correct reports of behavior in the 
behavior processing condition.  
Results 
 As with Experiment 1, we calculated the proportion of responses indicated as final hire 
decisions for each type of trial. A mixed-factorial ANOVA was conducted to analyze the 
proportion of affirmative responses as a function of the three-level within-subject trial type factor 
(enact, intend, and control), and the three-level between-subject processing condition (during 
enact trials, during intend trials, and during no trials). A Huynd-Feldt correction was used 
because the data violated the assumption of sphericity. The main effect of trial type was, once 
again, statistically significant, F(1.92, 220.86) = 118.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .51. The proportion of 
affirmative responses was higher in the intend (M = .54, SD = .34) than the control (M = .30, SD 
= .29) trials, t(117) = 7.82, p < .001, d = 0.77, but higher still in the enact (M = .80, SD = .24) 
than the intend trials, t(117) = 6.56, p < .001, d = 0.88. 
 Importantly, there was a significant interaction between the trial types and the processing 
conditions, F(3.84, 220.86) = 16.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .22 (see Figure 3). There was no difference 
in the proportion of affirmative responses in intend trials when either intentions (M = .45, SD = 
.39) or enactments (M = .43, SD = .31) were processed in detail, p = 0.759, d = -0.06, but both 
significantly differed from the proportion of affirmative responses when no detailed processing 
occurred in any trial (M = .75, SD = .22), p < .001, d = 0.97 and d = 1.18, respectively. This 
 16 
replicates the results from the previous experiment, indicating that processing information in 
detail is capable of reducing falsely-recalled behaviors in intend trials, compared to a condition 
wherein no detailed processing occurs. However, when participants engaged in detailed 
processing during enact trials, the accuracy in recalled enactments was higher (M = .94, SD = 
.13), compared to when no processing instructions were present (M = .78, SD = .24), and higher 
still compared to when processing took place during intend trials (M = .65, SD = .25). This was 
also the highest level of accuracy seen across all conditions in the two studies. 
Discussion 
 Contrary to what was hypothesized, this experiment found that, regardless of whether 
participants engaged in detailed processing of their behavior or their intentions, encoding 
information in more detail reduced the likelihood of producing intention-driven illusory 
behaviors. Yet, the engagement of detailed processing of behaviors had the dual benefit of both 
reducing false reports of enactment, as well as improving recognition accuracy of completed 
behaviors. Therefore, this experiment suggests that engaging in detailed processing is most 
beneficial when it is done to keep track of what you have already completed.  
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 We are always forming intentions that we want to act upon, whether it be to do 
something mundane, like placing our keys on the hook by the door when we come home, or 
something important, like going to pick up our family from the airport. The formation of 
intentions, however, can occasionally have the ironic effect of undermining behavior. In two 
studies, we have replicated past research to show that intentions do increase the likelihood of 
producing intention-driven illusory behaviors, compared to a control condition. We have also 
extended past work by suggesting that there are ways to attenuate this effect. Experiment 1 
showed that processing intentions in a more detailed and vivid manner reduced the proportions 
of illusory behaviors reported. Experiment 2 demonstrated that, contrary to what was 
hypothesized, this type of processing was most effective when it was done to keep track of 
behaviors. Overall, this research suggests that encoding information in more detail reduces errors 
of intention-behavior conflation.  
This thesis, therefore, posits two means of attenuating intention-driven illusory behaviors. 
First, if one needs to discriminate between an intended and completed behavior, encoding the 
intention in detail will be most beneficial. The rationale is that this processing facilitates 
discrimination between intentions and behavior in memory--that is, reducing errors associated 
with source monitoring during recall and recognition (Johnson, et al., 1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 
2000). Second, the benefits of keeping track of behaviors during enactment is doubly beneficial, 
as it not only reduces the conflation between intentions and behaviors, but increases overall 
behavioral recognition. Monitoring presently enacted behaviors thus allows intentions to become 
relevant as behavioral guides without the risk of false memories. 
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 Additionally, this research extends the understanding of the intention-behavior 
association. As the current model exists, the relation between intentions and behavior are seen to 
occur on a linear plane. Replicating some recent work conducted by Jones and Albarracín 
(2015), we have shown that there are instances when intentions do not serve as facilitators of 
behavior. Instead, the formation of an intention can lead to the belief that the behavior has 
already been enacted. This resonates with past work on the counterintuitive effects of intentions 
(e.g., situations wherein the public expression of an intention reduces the likelihood that the 
intention will be followed by behavior; Gollwitzer, Sheeran, Michalski & Seifert, 2009). 
Intentions are undeniably associated with behaviors. It is, however, important to understand the 
boundaries of the intention-behavior association, and when intentions might not serve as 
predictive of behaviors. 
A limitation of our research is that we cannot disentangle what specifically led to 
improvements in memory for behaviors and intentions. The detailed processing condition 
presumably led participants to encode information in more detail, thereby facilitating their ability 
to discriminate between intentions and behaviors in memory. The manipulation likely reduced 
source monitoring errors during the retrieval of these memories. Yet, with the behavioral 
paradigm we have used, it is difficult to ascertain whether the effects we see are a result of 
encoding, retrieval or a combination of the two (as we posit). Thus, future work could address 
this issue by running a variant of this experiment using electrophysiological measures to gain 
better clarity on the processes underlying this effect. Such an approach would lend to the 
development of better strategies that specifically target the processes at work. 
There has been an increase in the pervasiveness of technology in all aspects of life, 
including childhood (e.g., Plowman, McPake & Stephen, 2010), education (e.g., Li & Ma, 2010) 
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and health care (e.g., Vervloet et al., 2012). With this advent of technology, it is interesting to see 
where this research stands and what it has yet to explore. For example, with email and phone 
applications that can remind individuals to enact a certain behavior on a specific day and at a 
certain time, or keep track of what they have already completed, accurate memory for incomplete 
intentions may be unnecessary.  If an external application can tell you what to do or what you 
have already done, why would you need to keep track of this yourself? We posit that, in cases of 
inconsistent use (e.g., forgetting to set yourself a reminder), or situations with distractions (e.g., 
when you are interrupted while trying to execute the intention), it is still necessary to discern 
whether you acted upon your intentions or not. Nevertheless, this is another interesting avenue 
for future research. 
An important question in this line of work is to understand whether intention-driven 
illusory behaviors are actually less likely for ecologically relevant domains. For example, are 
individuals likely to confuse their intentions to feed their offspring, or their intentions to avoid 
detection by a predator, with behaviors they have already enacted?  It seems unlikely that 
intention-driven illusory behaviors would occur in domains with fitness-relevant consequences, 
as the existence of such conflation would likely led to failures in fitness. The investigation of 
false illusions of behavior in such domains could help identify boundary conditions, and thus, be 
a relevant area of investigation in the future. 
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CHAPTER 5  
FIGURES 
Figure 1 
Associations between Intentions, Behaviors and Memories of Behavior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intention Behavior Memory of Behavior 
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Figure 2 
Proportion of Reported Enactments in Intend Trials for No, Gist and Detailed Processing 
Conditions 
 
 
Note. For intend trials, higher proportions of reported enactments reflect error, specifically, 
intention-driven illusory behaviors.  
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Figure 3 
Proportion of Reported Enactments in Intend Trials for No Processing, and Processing During 
Enact and Intend Trials 
 
 
Note. For intend trials, higher proportions of reported enactments reflect error, specifically, 
intention-driven illusory behaviors.  
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APPENDIX A 
MATERIALS FOR HIRING PARADIGM 
The pre-trial screen seen by participants in the intend trials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
The truncated job application forms seen by participants in the intend trials. 
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The post-trial screen seen by participants during the recognition phase. 
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APPENDIX B  
MATERIALS FOR PROCESSING CONDITIONS 
Handout given to participants in the gist processing condition.  
In order to help you with your hiring decisions, the following sheet has been provided for you. 
For those applicants who you are only able to make an intention to hire or not hire, please write 
down the alphanumeric code presented with their photograph, and mark down your intended 
hiring decision.  
 
Applicant’s Information (alphanumeric code):           Intention (intention to hire/not hire): 
 
_______________________________________         ________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________         ________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________         ________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________         ________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________         ________________________________ 
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Handout given to participants in the detailed processing condition.  
In order to help you with your hiring decisions, the following sheet has been provided for you. 
For those applicants who you are only able to make an intention to hire or not hire, please write 
down the alphanumeric code presented with their photograph, and mark down your intended 
hiring decision. However, to further assist you, please also take note of any other salient 
characteristics of these applicants, including their gender, physical features, whether they 
resemble someone you know etc. Feel free to give them a nickname, create a story about why 
they may have applied and so on. Also, take note of anything else that led you to your intention.  
 
Applicant’s Information (alphanumeric code, gender,          Intention (intention to hire/not hire): 
features etc.): 
 
_______________________________________         ______________________________ 
 
_______________________________________         ______________________________ 
 
_______________________________________         ______________________________ 
 
_______________________________________         ______________________________ 
 
_______________________________________         ______________________________ 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
